Compensating affected parties necessary for rapid coal phase-out but expensive if extended to major emitters

L. Nacke, V. Vinichenko, A. Cherp, A. Jakhmola & J. Jewell. (2024). Compensating affected parties necessary for rapid coal phase-out but expensive if extended to major emitters. Nature Communications 15, 3742. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-47667-w

Coal power phase-out is critical for climate mitigation, yet it harms workers, companies, and coal-dependent regions. We find that more than half of countries that pledge coal phase-out have “just transition” policies which compensate these actors. Compensation is larger in countries with more ambitious coal phase-out pledges and most commonly directed to national and regional governments or companies, with a small share going directly to workers. Globally, compensation amounts to over $200 billion (uncertainty 163-258), about half of which is funded through international schemes, mostly through Just Energy Transition Partnerships and the European Union Just Transition Fund. If similar transfers are extended to China and India to phase out coal in line with the Paris temperature targets, compensation flows could become larger than current international climate financing. Our findings highlight that the socio-political acceptance of coal phase-out has a tangible economic component which should be factored into assessing the feasibility of achieving climate targets.

Have climate policies accelerated energy transitions? Historical evolution of electricity mix in the G7 and the EU compared to net-zero targets

M. Suzuki, J. Jewell & A. Cherp. (2023). Have climate policies accelerated energy transitions? Historical evolution of electricity mix in the G7 and the EU compared to net-zero targets. Energy Research & Social Science 106, 103281. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103281

Climate policies are often assumed to have significant impacts on the nature and speed of energy transitions. To investigate this hypothesis, we develop an approach to categorise, trace, and compare energy transitions across countries and time periods. We apply this approach to analyse electricity transitions in the G7 and the EU between 1960 and 2022, specifically examining whether and how climate policies altered the transitions beyond historical trends. Additionally, we conduct a feasibility analysis of the required transition in these countries by 2035 to keep the global temperature increase below 1.5°C. We find that climate policies have so far had limited impacts: while they may have influenced the choice of deployed technologies and the type of transitions, they have not accelerated the growth of low-carbon technologies or hastened the decline of fossil fuels. Instead, electricity transitions in the G7 and the EU have strongly correlated with the changes in electricity demand throughout the last six decades. In contrast, meeting the 1.5°C target requires unprecedented supply-centred transitions by 2035 where all G7 countries and the EU must expand low-carbon electricity five times faster and reduce fossil fuels two times faster on average compared to the rates in 2015–2020. This highlights the insufficiency of incremental changes and the need for a radically stronger effort to meet the climate target.

Do policy targets change technology growth trajectories? Understanding the steady growth of onshore wind in Europe

Vetier, M., Pavlenko, A., Jewell, J., Cherp, A. and V. Vinichenko (pre-print). Do policy targets change technology growth trajectories? Understanding the steady growth of onshore wind in Europe. POLET Working Paper series 2024-3

ABSTRACT

Conflicts surrounding the expansion of wind power in Europe are increasing (Diógenes et al. 2020; Lundheim et al. 2022) which has hindered its growth in recent years (Pavlenko and Cherp 2023). However, in the near future, wind power needs to expand much more rapidly to meet the EU's climate and energy security goals (Vinichenko et al. 2023; Pavlenko and Cherp 2023). In fact, meeting the goals for renewable power of the Fit for 55 Package (EC 2021), REPowerEU (EC 2022d) and updated Renewable Energy Directive (EC 2023e) would require faster growth of onshore wind power across the EU compared to what has been observed not only in the EU but even in most individual countries (Vinichenko et al. 2023).

In this paper, we seek to understand whether and how European countries plan to re-accelerate the recently stalling onshore wind power deployment considering the increasing conflicts surrounding this technology. We start with analyzing the current and historical growth patterns and maximum growth rates of onshore wind power in European countries and compare these to a similar analysis completed in 2021 (Cherp et al. 2021). We show that in most European countries (except Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden), the growth of wind power is no longer accelerating or is even slowing down.

Subsequently, we look into 17 countries’ recently updated National Energy and Climate Plans to identify their national targets for onshore wind power deployment and analyze whether and how these targets would change the historical growth trajectories. We find that eleven countries have set national targets to accelerate the historical growth of wind power, and five countries aim for growth that is faster than ever observed globally. This demonstrates the challenges for policies to overcome the inertia of socio-technical systems surrounding the deployment of wind power.

To investigate whether and how such challenges were addressed historically, the paper reviews cases of re-acceleration of onshore wind power growth in the past. We identify five notable cases of past re-acceleration (Austria, Denmark, Poland, Portugal, and Spain) and show that these have mostly been due to major changes in the national policy environment. We find that historically stalling was induced by halting or significantly reducing subsidies, regulatory uncertainties, and the enaction of policies unfavorable to wind power growth, and re-acceleration was in most cases linked to the increasing of regulatory certainty, re-establishment or increasing of subsidies, and withdrawal of unfavorable policies. This is unlikely to guide the current situation.

We then investigate policies proposed by the European Commission and find that these aim to address administrative, technical, and financial problems rather than social conflicts over land and other issues. Finally, we provide a detailed analysis of Sweden’s case of attempting but failing to overcome a recurring onshore wind siting deadlock.

We conclude by pointing out that to meet the onshore wind targets, European countries will likely need to implement different policy measures than what they have applied in the past.

Link to pre-print

Accelerating energy transitions under security crises

A. Pavlenko, J.Jewell, A. Cherp (pre-print). Accelerating energy transitions under security crises. POLET Working paper series 24-1

ABSTRACT

To mitigate climate change, transition to clean energy should proceed faster than in the last three decades. Can policies overcome economic, technological and social inertia to achieve the required acceleration, and if so, under what conditions? The 2022 REPowerEU plan is an excellent case to investigate these questions because it responds to a profound energy security threat (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) in advanced economies that are already the global leaders in decarbonisation. Here we analyse to which extent REPowerEU and related policies aim to accelerate energy transitions, what has enabled the ambitious targets, and whether these are feasible. Considering policy-technology co-evolution involving multiple feedbacks and non-linear growth, we define policy-driven acceleration as a significant deviation of feasible policy goals from the S-curve of technology diffusion reflecting empirical trends, near-term projections and analogies.

We show that REPowerEU sets unprecedented targets implying acceleration of all renewables and a radical deviation from the onshore wind growth trajectory. At the same time, REPowerEU is not an isolated crisis response, but a continuation of a policy shift that started around 2018 and included the European Green Deal (2019), the ‘Fit for 55’ package (2021), and related plans. Before 2018, policy targets extended historical trends and did not become more ambitious over time. Although motivated by climate concerns, they were only weakly linked to long-term climate goals but strongly shaped by technological uncertainties and economic costs. Energy security was seen as protection from short-term shocks through resilient infrastructure and did not directly shape the goals for renewables. In contrast, post-2018 policies decisively link the net-zero vision for 2050 and the 2030 renewable targets.

In 2022, these climate-derived targets were securitised through directly linking them to energy independence from Russian oil and gas, now viewed as a long-term security concern. Both net-zero and energy independence goals were inspired by the declining costs of renewables and by the emerging technological opportunities of substituting fossil fuels in transport, industry and heating through low-carbon electrification. We analyse whether the new targets are feasible using the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ view of feasibility by Jewell and Cherp (2023). We argue that the main barriers for onshore wind are conflicting land uses, for offshore wind - uncertainties around the infrastructure and complementary technologies, and for solar power - grid integration. We show that the required growth of each renewable technology is similar to the growth of nuclear in Western Europe in the 1960s-1980s. The similarities between the two contexts, including the presence of an energy security crisis, give hope that the planned growth is feasible. However, the combined growth of solar and wind is entirely unprecedented, although on a smaller scale, a similarly fast growth of nuclear occurred in France and Sweden. Our findings indicate that policy-driven acceleration of energy transitions might be possible but requires a unique constellation of motivations and capacities. Historical analogies provide useful benchmarks for the attainable speed of transition, but more research is needed on the applicability of policy lessons across different low-carbon technologies.

Link to pre-print.

Historical diffusion of nuclear, wind and solar power in different national contexts: implications for climate mitigation pathways

V. Vinichenko, J. Jewell, J. Jacobsson, A. Cherp. (2023). Historical diffusion of nuclear, wind and solar power in different national contexts: implications for climate mitigation pathways. Environmental Research Letters 18, 094066. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acf47a

Climate change mitigation requires rapid expansion of low-carbon electricity but there is a disagreement on whether available technologies such as renewables and nuclear power can be scaled up sufficiently fast. Here we analyze the diffusion of nuclear (from the 1960s), as well as wind and solar (from the 1980–90s) power. We show that all these technologies have been adopted in most large economies except major energy exporters, but solar and wind have diffused across countries faster and wider than nuclear. After the initial adoption, the maximum annual growth for nuclear power has been 2.6% of national electricity supply (IQR 1.3%–6%), for wind − 1.1% (0.6%–1.7%), and for solar − 0.8% (0.5%–1.3%). The fastest growth of nuclear power occurred in Western Europe in the 1980s, a response by industrialized democracies to the energy supply crises of the 1970s. The European Union (EU), currently experiencing a similar energy supply shock, is planning to expand wind and solar at similarly fast rates. This illustrates that national contexts can impact the speed of technology diffusion at least as much as technology characteristics like cost, granularity, and complexity. In the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change mitigation pathways, renewables grow much faster than nuclear due to their lower projected costs, though empirical evidence does not show that the cost is the sole factor determining the speed of diffusion. We demonstrate that expanding low-carbon electricity in Asia in line with the 1.5 °C target requires growth of nuclear power even if renewables increase as fast as in the most ambitious EU's plans. 2 °C-consistent pathways in Asia are compatible with replicating China's nuclear power plans in the whole region, while simultaneously expanding renewables as fast as in the near-term projections for the EU. Our analysis demonstrates the usefulness of empirically-benchmarked feasibility spaces for future technology projections.

Feasibility trade-offs in decarbonisation of power sector with high coal dependence: A case of Korea

M. Hyun, A. Cherp, J. Jewell, Y. J. Kim & J. Eom. (2023). Feasibility trade-offs in decarbonisation of power sector with high coal dependence: A case of Korea. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Transition, 3, 100050. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rset.2023.100050

Decarbonising the power sector requires feasible strategies for the rapid phase-out of fossil fuels and the expansion of low-carbon sources. This study assesses the feasibility of plausible decarbonisation scenarios for the power sector in the Republic of Korea through 2050 and 2060. Our power plant stock accounting model results show that achieving zero emissions from the power sector by the mid-century requires either an ambitious expansion of renewables backed by gas-fired generation equipped with carbon capture and storage or a significant increase of nuclear power. The first strategy implies replicating and maintaining for decades the maximum growth rates of solar power achieved in leading countries and becoming an early and ambitious adopter of the carbon capture and storage technology. The alternative expansion of nuclear power has historical precedents in Korea and other countries but may not be acceptable in the current political and regulatory environment. Hence, our analysis shows that the potential hurdles for decarbonisation in the power sector in Korea are formidable but manageable and should be overcome over the coming years, which gives hope to other similar countries.

Phasing out coal for 2 °C target requires worldwide replication of most ambitious national plans despite security and fairness concerns

V. Vinichenko, M. Vetier, J. Jewell, L. Nacke  & A. Cherp.  (2023). Phasing out coal for 2 °C target requires worldwide replication of most ambitious national plans despite security and fairness concerns. Environmental Research Letters 18, 014031. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acadf6

Ending the use of unabated coal power is a key climate change mitigation measure. However, we do not know how fast it is feasible to phase-out coal on the global scale. Historical experience of individual countries indicates feasible coal phase-out rates, but can these be upscaled to the global level and accelerated by deliberate action? To answer this question, we analyse 72 national coal power phase-out pledges and show that these pledges have diffused to more challenging socio-economic contexts and now cover 17% of the global coal power fleet, but their impact on emissions (up to 4.8 Gt CO2 avoided by 2050) remains small compared to what is needed for achieving Paris climate targets. We also show that the ambition of pledges is similar across countries and broadly in line with historical precedents of coal power decline. While some pledges strengthen over time, up to 10% have been weakened by the energy crisis caused by the Russo-Ukrainian war. We construct scenarios of coal power decline based on empirically-grounded assumptions about future diffusion and ambition of coal phase-out policies. We show that under these assumptions unabated coal power generation in 2022–2050 would be between the median generation in 2 °C-consistent IPCC AR6 pathways and the third quartile in 2.5 °C-consistent pathways. More ambitious coal phase-out scenarios require much stronger effort in Asia than in OECD countries, which raises fairness and equity concerns. The majority of the 1.5 °C- and 2 °C-consistent IPCC pathways envision even more unequal distribution of effort and faster coal power decline in India and China than has ever been historically observed in individual countries or pledged by climate leaders.

Historical precedents and feasibility of rapid coal and gas decline required for the 1.5°C target

V. Vinichenko, A. Cherp, J. Jewell. (2021). Historical precedents and feasibility of rapid coal and gas decline required for the 1.5°C target. One Earth 4, 1477–1490. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.09.012

To limit global warming to 1.5C, fossil fuel use must rapidly decline, but historical precedents for such large-scale transitions are lacking. Here we identify 147 historical episodes and policy pledges of fossil fuel decline in 105 countries and global regions between 1960 and 2018. We analyze 43 cases in larger systems most relevant to climate scenarios. One-half of 1.5C-compatible scenarios envision coal decline in Asia faster than in any of these cases. The remaining scenarios as well as many scenarios for coal and gas decline in other regions have precedents only where oil was replaced by coal, gas, or nuclear power in response to energy security threats. Achieving the 1.5C target will be difficult in the absence of fossil fuel decline mechanisms that extend far beyond historical experience or current pledges.

Failing the formative phase: the global diffusion of nuclear power is limited by national markets

E. Brutschin, A. Cherp, & J. Jewell. (2021). Failing the formative phase: the global diffusion of nuclear power is limited by national markets. Energy Research & Social Science, 80, 102221. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102221

Understanding the role of technology characteristics and the context in the diffusion of new energy technologies is important for assessing feasibility of climate mitigation. We examine the historical adoption of nuclear power as a case of a complex large scale energy technology. We conduct an event history analysis of grid connections of first sizable commercial nuclear power reactors in 79 countries between 1950 and 2018. We show that the introduction of nuclear power can largely be explained by contextual variables such as the proximity of a country to a major technology supplier (‘ease of diffusion’), the size of the economy, electricity demand growth, and energy import dependence (‘market attractiveness’). The lack of nuclear newcomers in the early 1990s can be explained by the lack of countries with high growth in electricity demand and sufficient capacities to build their first nuclear power plant, either on their own or with international help. We also find that nuclear accidents, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the advances made in competing technologies played only a minor role in nuclear technology failing to be established in more countries. Our analysis improves understanding of the feasibility of introducing contested and expensive technologies in a heterogenous world with motivations and capacities that differ across countries and by a patchwork of international relations. While countries with high state capacity or support from a major technology supplier are capable of introducing large-scale technologies quickly, technology diffusion to other regions might undergo significant delays due to lower motivations and capacities.

Cost of non-uniform climate policies

A. Cherp. (2021). Cost of non-uniform climate policies. Nature Climate Change, 1-2. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01133-3. Free SharedIt link (view only).

Economically optimal climate strategies may be politically less feasible because they need strong collective action. Fortunately, achieving climate goals through more realistic differentiated policies may not be much more expensive.

National growth dynamics of wind and solar power compared to the growth required for global climate targets

A. Cherp, V. Vinichenko, J. Tosun, J. Gordon & J. Jewell. (2021). National growth dynamics of wind and solar power compared to the growth required for global climate targets. Nature Energy 6, 742–754. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00863-0. Free SharedIt link (view only) code on GitHub: https://github.com/poletresearch/RES_article

Climate mitigation scenarios envision considerable growth of wind and solar power, but scholars disagree on how this growth compares with historical trends. Here we fit growth models to wind and solar trajectories to identify countries in which growth has already stabilized after the initial acceleration. National growth has followed S-curves to reach maximum annual rates of 0.8% (interquartile range of 0.6–1.1%) of the total electricity supply for onshore wind and 0.6% (0.4–0.9%) for solar. In comparison, one-half of 1.5 °C-compatible scenarios envision global growth of wind power above 1.3% and of solar power above 1.4%, while one-quarter of these scenarios envision global growth of solar above 3.3% per year. Replicating or exceeding the fastest national growth globally may be challenging because, so far, countries that introduced wind and solar power later have not achieved higher maximum growth rates, despite their generally speedier progression through the technology adoption cycle.

Societal transformations in models for energy and climate policy: the ambitious next step

E. Trutnevyte, L.F. Hirt, N. Bauer, A. Cherp, A. Hawkes, O.Y. Edelenbosch, S. Pedde, & D.P. van Vuuren. (2020). Societal transformations in models for energy and climate policy: The Ambitious Next Step. One Earth, 1 (4), 423-433. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2019.12.002.

Whether and how long-term energy and climate targets can be reached depend on a range of interlinked factors: technology, economy, environment, policy, and society at large. Integrated assessment models of climate change or energy-system models have limited representations of societal transformations, such as behavior of various actors, transformation dynamics in time, and heterogeneity across and within societies. After reviewing the state of the art, we propose a research agenda to guide experiments to integrate more insights from social sciences into models: (1) map and assess societal assumptions in existing models, (2) conduct empirical research on generalizable and quantifiable patterns to be integrated into models, and (3) build and extensively validate modified or new models. Our proposed agenda offers three benefits: interdisciplinary learning between modelers and social scientists, improved models with a more complete representation of multifaceted reality, and identification of new and more effective solutions to energy and climate challenges.

On the political feasibility of climate change mitigation pathways: Is it too late to keep warming below 1.5°C?

J. Jewell. & A. Cherp. (2020). On the political feasibility of climate change mitigation pathways: Is it too late to keep warming below 1.5°C? Wiley Interdisciplinary Rev (WIRE) Climate Change, 11 (621). Open Access. DOI: 10.1002/wcc.621.

Keeping global warming below 1.5°C is technically possible but is it politically feasible? Understanding political feasibility requires answering three questions: (a) “Feasibility of what?,” (b) “Feasibility when and where?,” and (c) “Feasibility for whom?.” In relation to the 1.5°C target, these questions translate into (a) identifying specific actions comprising the 1.5°C pathways; (b) assessing the economic and political costs of these actions in different socioeconomic and political contexts; and (c) assessing the economic and institutional capacity of relevant social actors to bear these costs. This view of political feasibility stresses costs and capacities in contrast to the prevailing focus on benefits and motivations which mistakes desirability for feasibility. The evidence on the political feasibility of required climate actions is not systematic, but clearly indicates that the costs of required actions are too high in relation to capacities to bear these costs in relevant contexts. In the future, costs may decline and capacities may increase which would reduce political constraints for at least some solutions. However, this is unlikely to happen in time to avoid a temperature overshoot. Further research should focus on exploring the “dynamic political feasibility space” constrained by costs and capacities in order to find more feasible pathways to climate stabilization. This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Decarbonizing Energy and/or Reducing Demand