Compensating affected parties necessary for rapid coal phase-out but expensive if extended to major emitters

L. Nacke, V. Vinichenko, A. Cherp, A. Jakhmola & J. Jewell. (2024). Compensating affected parties necessary for rapid coal phase-out but expensive if extended to major emitters. Nature Communications 15, 3742. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-47667-w

Coal power phase-out is critical for climate mitigation, yet it harms workers, companies, and coal-dependent regions. We find that more than half of countries that pledge coal phase-out have “just transition” policies which compensate these actors. Compensation is larger in countries with more ambitious coal phase-out pledges and most commonly directed to national and regional governments or companies, with a small share going directly to workers. Globally, compensation amounts to over $200 billion (uncertainty 163-258), about half of which is funded through international schemes, mostly through Just Energy Transition Partnerships and the European Union Just Transition Fund. If similar transfers are extended to China and India to phase out coal in line with the Paris temperature targets, compensation flows could become larger than current international climate financing. Our findings highlight that the socio-political acceptance of coal phase-out has a tangible economic component which should be factored into assessing the feasibility of achieving climate targets.

Coal phase-out pledges follow peak coal: evidence from 60 years of growth and decline in coal power capacity worldwide

O. M. Lægreid, A. Cherp, J. Jewell. (2023). Coal phase-out pledges follow peak coal: evidence from 60 years of growth and decline in coal power capacity worldwide. Oxford Open Energy 2. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ooenergy/oiad009

Transitioning to net-zero carbon emissions requires phasing-out unabated coal power; however, recently it has only been declining in some countries, while it stagnated or even increased in others. Where and under what circumstances, has coal capacity reached its peak and begun to decline? We address this question with an empirical analysis of coal capacity in 56 countries, accounting for 99% of coal generation in the world. The peaks in national coal power have been equally spread per decade since 1970. The peaks are more likely to occur in country-years with high levels of electoral democracy, higher GDP per capita, slower electricity demand growth, and with low levels of political corruption. Normally, peaking coal power preceded rather than followed political coal phase-out pledges, often with long time lags. We conclude that though the cost of coal alternatives are declining and concerns over climate change increasing, coal power does not automatically peak even in situations with low demand growth, aging power plants and high import dependence. A quick and decisive destabilization of coal regimes requires, in addition, having sufficient economic capacities and strong democratic governance.

Phasing out coal for 2 °C target requires worldwide replication of most ambitious national plans despite security and fairness concerns

V. Vinichenko, M. Vetier, J. Jewell, L. Nacke  & A. Cherp.  (2023). Phasing out coal for 2 °C target requires worldwide replication of most ambitious national plans despite security and fairness concerns. Environmental Research Letters 18, 014031. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acadf6

Ending the use of unabated coal power is a key climate change mitigation measure. However, we do not know how fast it is feasible to phase-out coal on the global scale. Historical experience of individual countries indicates feasible coal phase-out rates, but can these be upscaled to the global level and accelerated by deliberate action? To answer this question, we analyse 72 national coal power phase-out pledges and show that these pledges have diffused to more challenging socio-economic contexts and now cover 17% of the global coal power fleet, but their impact on emissions (up to 4.8 Gt CO2 avoided by 2050) remains small compared to what is needed for achieving Paris climate targets. We also show that the ambition of pledges is similar across countries and broadly in line with historical precedents of coal power decline. While some pledges strengthen over time, up to 10% have been weakened by the energy crisis caused by the Russo-Ukrainian war. We construct scenarios of coal power decline based on empirically-grounded assumptions about future diffusion and ambition of coal phase-out policies. We show that under these assumptions unabated coal power generation in 2022–2050 would be between the median generation in 2 °C-consistent IPCC AR6 pathways and the third quartile in 2.5 °C-consistent pathways. More ambitious coal phase-out scenarios require much stronger effort in Asia than in OECD countries, which raises fairness and equity concerns. The majority of the 1.5 °C- and 2 °C-consistent IPCC pathways envision even more unequal distribution of effort and faster coal power decline in India and China than has ever been historically observed in individual countries or pledged by climate leaders.

Pathway to a land-neutral expansion of Brazilian renewable fuel production

L. R. Camargo, G. Castro, K. Gruber, J. Jewell & M. Klingler. (2022). Pathway to a land-neutral expansion of Brazilian renewable fuel production. Nature Communications 13, 3157. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-30850-2

Biofuels are currently the only available bulk renewable fuel. They have, however, limited expansion potential due to high land requirements and associated risks for biodiversity, food security, and land conflicts. We therefore propose to increase output from ethanol refineries in a land-neutral methanol pathway: surplus CO2-streams from fermentation are combined with H2 from renewably powered electrolysis to synthesize methanol. We illustrate this pathway with the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol industry using a spatio-temporal model. The fuel output of existing ethanol generation facilities can be increased by 43%–49% or ~100 TWh without using additional land. This amount is sufficient to cover projected growth in Brazilian biofuel demand in 2030. We identify a trade-off between renewable energy generation technologies: wind power requires the least amount of land whereas a mix of wind and solar costs the least. In the cheapest scenario, green methanol is competitive to fossil methanol at an average carbon price of 95 €/tCO2.

Quitting fossil fuels: how fast can the world do it?

J. Jewell, M. Vetier, V. Vinichenko, O.M. Lægreid, S. Pai, A. Cherp, H. Brauers, I. Braunger, L. Nacke, H. Zerriffi. (2022). Quitting fossil fuels: how fast can the world do it? Policy brief.

To meet climate targets, fossil fuel use needs to rapidly decline. Has anything similar happened in the past? Do current coal phase-out efforts put us on the path to save the climate? And how would such radical fossil fuel decline affect fossil fuel workers? To answer these questions, we analyzed historical precedents of fossil fuel decline, current efforts to phase-out coal and future pathways to reach climate targets.

We find surprising precedents of decline in the 1970s and 80s when industrialized wealthy economies responded to the oil crises. At the same time, the current pledges of coal phase-out are insufficient to deliver on the 1.5°C targets and are limited to countries with low costs and high enough capacity to overcome those costs. Nevertheless, in spite of the opposition from fossil fuel workers to transitions, we identify opportunities for low-carbon jobs to replace fossil fuel jobs.

Download and read the policy brief from the Contractions project.

Liquefied natural gas expansion plans in Germany: The risk of gas lock-in under energy transitions

H. Brauers, I. Braunger & J. Jewell. (2021). Liquefied natural gas expansion plans in Germany: The risk of gas lock-in under energy transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 76, 102059. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102059

The German energy transition has been hailed as a role model for climate action. However, plans for the con­struction of three large-scale Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals are receiving strong state support. This is inconsistent with Germany’s climate targets, which require a reduction rather than expansion of natural gas consumption. In our paper, we aim to unpack the connection between the risk of natural gas lock-in and the energy transition. We analyse the co-evolution of the techno-economic, socio-technical and political realms of the German natural gas sector and influence of actors within that process. We use a combination of energy system and interview data, and introduce a new approach to triangulate material and actor analysis. We show that four natural gas lock-in mechanisms cause the support for LNG in Germany: (A) the geopolitical influence from the United States, combined with (B) security of supply concerns due to the planned coal and nuclear phase-out, (C) pressure from a wide variety of state and private sector actors, and (D) sunk investments in existing gas infra­ structure. Two additional mechanisms supporting the strong position of natural gas are (E) the strength of the emerging synthetic gas niche, and (F) weak opposition against LNG and natural gas. We highlight the severely overlooked lock-in potential and related emissions, which could complicate and decelerate energy transitions as more countries reach a more advanced phase of the energy transition.

Covid-19 and the politics of sustainable energy transitions

C. Kuzemko, M. Bradshaw, G. Bridge, A. Goldthau, J. Jewell, I. Overland, D. Scholten, T. van de Graaf & K. Westphal. (2020). Covid-19 and the politics of sustainable energy transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 68, 101685. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101685. Preprint.

In this perspectives piece, an interdisciplinary team of social science researchers considers the implications of Covid-19 for the politics of sustainable energy transitions. The emergency measures adopted by states, firms, and individuals in response to this global health crisis have driven a series of political, economic and social changes with potential to influence sustainable energy transitions. We identify some of the initial impacts of the ‘great lockdown’ on sustainable and fossil sources of energy, and consider how economic stimulus packages and social practices in the wake of the pandemic are likely to shape energy demand, the carbon-intensity of the energy system, and the speed of transitions. Adopting a broad multi-scalar and multi-actor approach to the analysis of energy system change, we highlight continuities and discontinuities with pre-pandemic trends. Discussion focuses on four key themes that shape the politics of sustainable energy transitions: (i) the short, medium and longterm temporalities of energy system change; (ii) practices of investment around clean-tech and divestment from fossil fuels; (iii) structures and scales of energy governance; and (iv) social practices around mobility, work and public health. While the effects of the pandemic continue to unfold, some of its sectoral and geographically differentiated impacts are already emerging. We conclude that the politics of sustainable energy transitions are now at a critical juncture, in which the form and direction of state support for post-pandemic economic recovery will be key.

Reply to: Why fossil fuel producer subsidies matter

J. Jewell, J. Emmerling, V. Vinichenko, C. Bertram, L. Berger, H. E. Daly, I. Keppo, V. Krey, D. E. H. J. Gernaat, K. Fragkiadakis, D. McCollum, L. Paroussas, K. Riahi, M. Tavoni & D. van Vuuren. (2020). Reply to: Why fossil fuel producer subsidies matter. Nature, 578 (7793), E5–E7. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1921-9.

Prospects for powering past coal

J. Jewell, V. Vinichenko, L. Nacke, & A. Cherp. (2019). Prospects for powering past coal. Nature Climate Change, 9(8), 592–597. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0509-6. Preprint.

To keep global warming within 1.5 °C of pre-industrial levels, there needs to be a substantial decline in the use of coal power by 2030 and in most scenarios, complete cessation by 2050. The members of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), launched in 2017 at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, are committed to “phasing out existing unabated coal power generation and a moratorium on new coal power generation without operational carbon capture and storage”. The alliance has been hailed as a ‘political watershed’ and a new ‘anti-fossil fuel norm’. Here we estimate that the premature retirement of power plants pledged by PPCA members would cut emissions by 1.6 GtCO2, which is 150 times less than globally committed emissions from existing coal power plants. We also investigated the prospect of major coal consumers joining the PPCA by systematically comparing members to non-members. PPCA members extract and use less coal and have older power plants, but this alone does not fully explain their pledges to phase out coal power. The members of the alliance are also wealthier and have more transparent and independent governments. Thus, what sets them aside from major coal consumers, such as China and India, are both lower costs of coal phase-out and a higher capacity to bear these costs. To limit warming, a rapid reduction in coal use is needed. Early retirement of coal power plants by members of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which includes mainly wealthy countries that use little coal, would have a modest climate impact. Prospects for expanding the Alliance are examined.

Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions

J. Jewell, D. McCollum, J. Emmerling, C. Bertram, D.E.H.J. Gernaat, V. Krey, L. Paroussos, L. Berger, K. Fragkiadakis, I. Keppo, N. Saadi, M. Tavoni, D.P. van Vuuren, V. Vinichenko, & K. Riahi. (2018). Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions. Nature. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25467. PrePrint.

Many governments use subsidies for fossil fuels to reduce the cost of energy for domestic consumption. This has led to the frequent argument that removing subsidies could play an important part in mitigating climate change. Now, Jessica Jewel and colleagues show that subsidy removal would indeed substantially lower emissions in fossil-fuel-exporting countries, but would reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by only a few per cent by 2030. This small reduction would largely be due to offsetting effects from international trade and fuel substitution. The authors also find that subsidy removal would not dramatically increase the use of renewable energy, adding to the suggestion that extensive revisions of subsidy policies would not produce a major benefit for climate mitigation.

Comparing electricity transitions: a historical analysis of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan

Cherp, A., Vinichenko, V., Jewell, J., Suzuki, M. & Antal, M. (2017). Comparing electricity transitions: a historical analysis of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan. Energy Policy, 101, 612-628. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.10.044.

This paper contributes to understanding national variations in using low-carbon electricity sources by comparing the evolution of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan. It develops and applies a framework for analyzing low-carbon electricity transitions based on interplay of techno-economic, political and socio-technical processes. We explain why in the 1970s–1980s, the energy paths of the two countries were remarkably similar, but since the 1990s Germany has become a leader in renewables while phasing out nuclear energy, whereas Japan has deployed less renewables while becoming a leader in nuclear power. We link these differences to the faster growth of electricity demand and energy insecurity in Japan, the easier diffusion of onshore wind power technology and the weakening of the nuclear power regime induced by stagnation and competition from coal and renewables in Germany. We show how these changes involve the interplay of five distinct mechanisms which may also play a role in other energy transitions.

Quantifying uncertainties influencing the long-term impacts of oil prices on energy markets and carbon emissions

D.L. McCollum, J. Jewell, V. Krey, M. Bazilian, M. Fay & K. Riahi. (2016). Quantifying uncertainties influencing the long-term impacts of oil prices on energy markets and carbon emissions. Nature Energy, 1 (7), 16077. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.77. Preprint.

Oil prices have fluctuated remarkably in recent years. Previous studies have analysed the impacts of future oil prices on the energy system and greenhouse gas emissions, but none have quantitatively assessed how the broader, energy-systemwide impacts of diverging oil price futures depend on a suite of critical uncertainties. Here we use the MESSAGE integrated assessment model to study several factors potentially influencing this interaction, thereby shedding light on which future unknowns hold the most importance. We find that sustained low or high oil prices could have a major impact on the global energy system over the next several decades; and depending on how the fuel substitution dynamics play out, the carbon dioxide consequences could be significant (for example, between 5 and 20% of the budget for staying below the internationally agreed 2 C target). Whether or not oil and gas prices decouple going forward is found to be the biggest uncertainty.