Cost of non-uniform climate policies

A. Cherp. (2021). Cost of non-uniform climate policies. Nature Climate Change, 1-2. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01133-3. Free SharedIt link (view only).

Economically optimal climate strategies may be politically less feasible because they need strong collective action. Fortunately, achieving climate goals through more realistic differentiated policies may not be much more expensive.

Meeting well-below 2°C target would increase energy sector jobs globally

S. Pai, J. Emmerling, L. Drouet, H. Zerriffi & J. Jewell. (2021). Meeting well-below 2°C target would increase energy sector jobs globally. One Earth, 4(7), 1026–1036. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.06.005.

To limit global warming to well-below 2°C (WB2C), fossil fuels must be replaced by low-carbon energy sources. Support for this transition is often dampened by the impact on fossil fuel jobs. Previous work shows that pro-climate polices could increase employment by 20 million net energy jobs, but these studies rely on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) jobs data, assumptions about jobs in non-OECD countries, and a single baseline assumption. Here we combine a global dataset of job intensities across 11 energy technologies and five job categories in 50 countries with an integrated assessment model under three shared socioeconomic pathways. We estimate direct energy jobs under a WB2C scenario and current policy scenarios. We find that, by 2050, energy sector jobs would grow from today’s 18 million to 26 million under a WB2C scenario compared with 21 million under the current policy scenario. Fossil fuel extraction jobs would rapidly decline, but losses will be compensated by gains in solar and wind jobs, particularly in the manufacturing sector (totaling 7.7 million in 2050).

National growth dynamics of wind and solar power compared to the growth required for global climate targets

A. Cherp, V. Vinichenko, J. Tosun, J. Gordon & J. Jewell. (2021). National growth dynamics of wind and solar power compared to the growth required for global climate targets. Nature Energy 6, 742–754. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00863-0. Free SharedIt link (view only) code on GitHub: https://github.com/poletresearch/RES_article

Climate mitigation scenarios envision considerable growth of wind and solar power, but scholars disagree on how this growth compares with historical trends. Here we fit growth models to wind and solar trajectories to identify countries in which growth has already stabilized after the initial acceleration. National growth has followed S-curves to reach maximum annual rates of 0.8% (interquartile range of 0.6–1.1%) of the total electricity supply for onshore wind and 0.6% (0.4–0.9%) for solar. In comparison, one-half of 1.5 °C-compatible scenarios envision global growth of wind power above 1.3% and of solar power above 1.4%, while one-quarter of these scenarios envision global growth of solar above 3.3% per year. Replicating or exceeding the fastest national growth globally may be challenging because, so far, countries that introduced wind and solar power later have not achieved higher maximum growth rates, despite their generally speedier progression through the technology adoption cycle.

Liquefied natural gas expansion plans in Germany: The risk of gas lock-in under energy transitions

H. Brauers, I. Braunger & J. Jewell. (2021). Liquefied natural gas expansion plans in Germany: The risk of gas lock-in under energy transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 76, 102059. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102059

The German energy transition has been hailed as a role model for climate action. However, plans for the con­struction of three large-scale Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals are receiving strong state support. This is inconsistent with Germany’s climate targets, which require a reduction rather than expansion of natural gas consumption. In our paper, we aim to unpack the connection between the risk of natural gas lock-in and the energy transition. We analyse the co-evolution of the techno-economic, socio-technical and political realms of the German natural gas sector and influence of actors within that process. We use a combination of energy system and interview data, and introduce a new approach to triangulate material and actor analysis. We show that four natural gas lock-in mechanisms cause the support for LNG in Germany: (A) the geopolitical influence from the United States, combined with (B) security of supply concerns due to the planned coal and nuclear phase-out, (C) pressure from a wide variety of state and private sector actors, and (D) sunk investments in existing gas infra­ structure. Two additional mechanisms supporting the strong position of natural gas are (E) the strength of the emerging synthetic gas niche, and (F) weak opposition against LNG and natural gas. We highlight the severely overlooked lock-in potential and related emissions, which could complicate and decelerate energy transitions as more countries reach a more advanced phase of the energy transition.

Covid-19 and the politics of sustainable energy transitions

C. Kuzemko, M. Bradshaw, G. Bridge, A. Goldthau, J. Jewell, I. Overland, D. Scholten, T. van de Graaf & K. Westphal. (2020). Covid-19 and the politics of sustainable energy transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 68, 101685. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101685. Preprint.

In this perspectives piece, an interdisciplinary team of social science researchers considers the implications of Covid-19 for the politics of sustainable energy transitions. The emergency measures adopted by states, firms, and individuals in response to this global health crisis have driven a series of political, economic and social changes with potential to influence sustainable energy transitions. We identify some of the initial impacts of the ‘great lockdown’ on sustainable and fossil sources of energy, and consider how economic stimulus packages and social practices in the wake of the pandemic are likely to shape energy demand, the carbon-intensity of the energy system, and the speed of transitions. Adopting a broad multi-scalar and multi-actor approach to the analysis of energy system change, we highlight continuities and discontinuities with pre-pandemic trends. Discussion focuses on four key themes that shape the politics of sustainable energy transitions: (i) the short, medium and longterm temporalities of energy system change; (ii) practices of investment around clean-tech and divestment from fossil fuels; (iii) structures and scales of energy governance; and (iv) social practices around mobility, work and public health. While the effects of the pandemic continue to unfold, some of its sectoral and geographically differentiated impacts are already emerging. We conclude that the politics of sustainable energy transitions are now at a critical juncture, in which the form and direction of state support for post-pandemic economic recovery will be key.

Solar has greater techno-economic resource suitability than wind for replacing coal mining jobs

S. Pai, H. Zerriffi, J. Jewell & J. Pathak. (2020). Solar has greater techno-economic resource suitability than wind for replacing coal mining jobs. Environmental Research Letters. 15 (3), 034065. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab6c6d.

Coal mining directly employs over 7 million workers and benefits millions more through indirect jobs. However, to meet the 1.5 °C global climate target, coal's share in global energy supply should decline between 73% and 97% by 2050. But what will happen to coal miners as coal jobs disappear ?Answering this question is necessary to ensure a just transition and to ensure that politically powerful coal mining interests do not impede energy transitions. Some suggest that coal miners can transition to renewable jobs. However, prior research has not investigated the potential for renewable jobs to replace 'local' coal mining jobs. Historic analyses of coal industry declines show that coal miners do not migrate when they lose their jobs. By focusing on China, India, the US, and Australia, which represent 70% of global coal production, we investigate: (1) the local solar and wind capacity required in each coal mining area to enable all coal miners to transition to solar/wind jobs; (2) whether there are suitable solar and wind power resources in coal mining areas in order to install solar/wind plants and create those jobs; and (3) the scale of renewables deployment required to transition coal miners in areas suitable for solar/wind power. We find that with the exception of the US, several GWs of solar or wind capacity would be required in each coal mining area to transition all coal miners to solar/wind jobs. Moreover, while solar has more resource suitability than wind in coal mining areas, these resources are not available everywhere. In China, the country with the largest coal mining workforce, only 29% of coal mining areas are suitable for solar power. In all four countries, less than 7% of coal mining areas have suitable wind resources. Further, countries would have to scale-up their current solar capacity significantly to transition coal miners who work in areas suitable for solar development.

Reply to: Why fossil fuel producer subsidies matter

J. Jewell, J. Emmerling, V. Vinichenko, C. Bertram, L. Berger, H. E. Daly, I. Keppo, V. Krey, D. E. H. J. Gernaat, K. Fragkiadakis, D. McCollum, L. Paroussas, K. Riahi, M. Tavoni & D. van Vuuren. (2020). Reply to: Why fossil fuel producer subsidies matter. Nature, 578 (7793), E5–E7. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1921-9.

Societal transformations in models for energy and climate policy: the ambitious next step

E. Trutnevyte, L.F. Hirt, N. Bauer, A. Cherp, A. Hawkes, O.Y. Edelenbosch, S. Pedde, & D.P. van Vuuren. (2020). Societal transformations in models for energy and climate policy: The Ambitious Next Step. One Earth, 1 (4), 423-433. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2019.12.002.

Whether and how long-term energy and climate targets can be reached depend on a range of interlinked factors: technology, economy, environment, policy, and society at large. Integrated assessment models of climate change or energy-system models have limited representations of societal transformations, such as behavior of various actors, transformation dynamics in time, and heterogeneity across and within societies. After reviewing the state of the art, we propose a research agenda to guide experiments to integrate more insights from social sciences into models: (1) map and assess societal assumptions in existing models, (2) conduct empirical research on generalizable and quantifiable patterns to be integrated into models, and (3) build and extensively validate modified or new models. Our proposed agenda offers three benefits: interdisciplinary learning between modelers and social scientists, improved models with a more complete representation of multifaceted reality, and identification of new and more effective solutions to energy and climate challenges.

On the political feasibility of climate change mitigation pathways: Is it too late to keep warming below 1.5°C?

J. Jewell. & A. Cherp. (2020). On the political feasibility of climate change mitigation pathways: Is it too late to keep warming below 1.5°C? Wiley Interdisciplinary Rev (WIRE) Climate Change, 11 (621). Open Access. DOI: 10.1002/wcc.621.

Keeping global warming below 1.5°C is technically possible but is it politically feasible? Understanding political feasibility requires answering three questions: (a) “Feasibility of what?,” (b) “Feasibility when and where?,” and (c) “Feasibility for whom?.” In relation to the 1.5°C target, these questions translate into (a) identifying specific actions comprising the 1.5°C pathways; (b) assessing the economic and political costs of these actions in different socioeconomic and political contexts; and (c) assessing the economic and institutional capacity of relevant social actors to bear these costs. This view of political feasibility stresses costs and capacities in contrast to the prevailing focus on benefits and motivations which mistakes desirability for feasibility. The evidence on the political feasibility of required climate actions is not systematic, but clearly indicates that the costs of required actions are too high in relation to capacities to bear these costs in relevant contexts. In the future, costs may decline and capacities may increase which would reduce political constraints for at least some solutions. However, this is unlikely to happen in time to avoid a temperature overshoot. Further research should focus on exploring the “dynamic political feasibility space” constrained by costs and capacities in order to find more feasible pathways to climate stabilization. This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Decarbonizing Energy and/or Reducing Demand

News and views climate-policy models debated: clarifying the role of IAMs

J. Jewell. (2019). News and views climate-policy models debated: clarifying the role of IAMs. Nature, 573, 349–349. Open Access. URL: https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-019-02744-9/d41586-019-02744-9.pdf.

Researchers and policymakers rely on computer simulations called integrated assessment models to determine the best strategies for tackling climate change. Here, scientists present opposing views on the suitability of these simulations.

Prospects for powering past coal

J. Jewell, V. Vinichenko, L. Nacke, & A. Cherp. (2019). Prospects for powering past coal. Nature Climate Change, 9(8), 592–597. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0509-6. Preprint.

To keep global warming within 1.5 °C of pre-industrial levels, there needs to be a substantial decline in the use of coal power by 2030 and in most scenarios, complete cessation by 2050. The members of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), launched in 2017 at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, are committed to “phasing out existing unabated coal power generation and a moratorium on new coal power generation without operational carbon capture and storage”. The alliance has been hailed as a ‘political watershed’ and a new ‘anti-fossil fuel norm’. Here we estimate that the premature retirement of power plants pledged by PPCA members would cut emissions by 1.6 GtCO2, which is 150 times less than globally committed emissions from existing coal power plants. We also investigated the prospect of major coal consumers joining the PPCA by systematically comparing members to non-members. PPCA members extract and use less coal and have older power plants, but this alone does not fully explain their pledges to phase out coal power. The members of the alliance are also wealthier and have more transparent and independent governments. Thus, what sets them aside from major coal consumers, such as China and India, are both lower costs of coal phase-out and a higher capacity to bear these costs. To limit warming, a rapid reduction in coal use is needed. Early retirement of coal power plants by members of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which includes mainly wealthy countries that use little coal, would have a modest climate impact. Prospects for expanding the Alliance are examined.

The international technological nuclear cooperation landscape: a new dataset and network analysis

J. Jewell, M. Vetier, & D. Garcia-Cabrera. (2019). The international technological nuclear cooperation landscape: a new dataset and network analysis. Energy Policy, 128, 838-852. Gated. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.12.024.

The pursuit of civil nuclear power, frequently justified in the name of national energy security, paradoxically entangles most states in long-term interdependencies with the few countries that can supply nuclear technologies. These interdependencies are insufficiently documented and poorly understood. This article presents and analyzes a new dataset of nuclear cooperation agreements signed or announced between 2000 and 2015. We find that Russia and the US dominate international technological nuclear cooperation, with the US’ dominance particularly prominent in safety and security and Russia’s in nuclear power plant construction, reactor and fuel supply, decommissioning and waste. When it comes to these technologies, Russia is the supplier in approximately half of all agreements; France, the US, China, Korea, and Japan together account for another 40%. All in all, six countries are suppliers in over 90% of all international nuclear agreements, a far higher supplier concentration than in oil and gas markets. These results show that the global future of nuclear power depends as much on international cooperation as on national motivations and capacities. Effective policies and institutions supporting the safe use of nuclear power should therefore be directed at managing its international as well as national aspects.

The politics of energy security

J. Jewell & E. Brutschin. (2019). The politics of energy security. I: K. Hancock & J. Allison (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Energy Politics, 247-274. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190861360.013.10.

Energy security has long been a main driver of energy policies, but its meaning has been contested by policy makers and scholars. The concept incorporates both material and intersubjective aspects, finding different expressions in different contexts and attracting the interest of diverse social actors and academic communities. This chapter identifies, compares, and contrasts five major approaches for analyzing energy security rooted in different scholarly traditions. It argues that in order to facilitate a dialogue among these approaches as well as policy comparison and learning, it is useful to conceptualize energy security as “low vulnerability of vital energy systems.” This definition opens avenues for productive research, unpacking the interplay between material and intersubjective aspects of “vulnerability” and “vitality” of energy systems. Future research should investigate the role of material factors alongside power, values, and trust in defining energy security; explain the gap between energy securitization and action; and explore the interaction between energy security and other energy policy goals.

Integrating techno-economic, socio-technical and political perspectives on national energy transitions: a meta-theoretical framework

A. Cherp, V. Vinichenko, J. Jewell, E. Brutschin, & B. Sovacool. (2018). Integrating techno-economic, socio-technical and political perspectives on national energy transitions: a meta-theoretical framework. Energy Research & Social Science, 37, 175–190. Open Access. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.015.

Economic development, technological innovation, and policy change are especially prominent factors shaping energy transitions. Therefore explaining energy transitions requires combining insights from disciplines investigating these factors. The existing literature is not consistent in identifying these disciplines nor proposing how they can be combined. We conceptualize national energy transitions as a co-evolution of three types of systems: energy flows and markets, energy technologies, and energy-related policies. The focus on the three types of systems gives rise to three perspectives on national energy transitions: techno-economic with its roots in energy systems analysis and various domains of economics; socio-technical with its roots in sociology of technology, STS, and evolutionary economics; and political with its roots in political science. We use the three perspectives as an organizing principle to propose a meta-theoretical framework for analyzing national energy transitions. Following Elinor Ostrom’s approach, the proposed framework explains national energy transitions through a nested conceptual map of variables and theories. In comparison with the existing meta-theoretical literature, the three perspectives framework elevates the role of political science since policies are likely to be increasingly prominent in shaping 21st century energy transitions.

Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions

J. Jewell, D. McCollum, J. Emmerling, C. Bertram, D.E.H.J. Gernaat, V. Krey, L. Paroussos, L. Berger, K. Fragkiadakis, I. Keppo, N. Saadi, M. Tavoni, D.P. van Vuuren, V. Vinichenko, & K. Riahi. (2018). Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions. Nature. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25467. PrePrint.

Many governments use subsidies for fossil fuels to reduce the cost of energy for domestic consumption. This has led to the frequent argument that removing subsidies could play an important part in mitigating climate change. Now, Jessica Jewel and colleagues show that subsidy removal would indeed substantially lower emissions in fossil-fuel-exporting countries, but would reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by only a few per cent by 2030. This small reduction would largely be due to offsetting effects from international trade and fuel substitution. The authors also find that subsidy removal would not dramatically increase the use of renewable energy, adding to the suggestion that extensive revisions of subsidy policies would not produce a major benefit for climate mitigation.

International political economy of nuclear energy

E. Brutschin & J. Jewell. (2018). International political economy of nuclear energy. Andreas Goldthau & Michael F. Keating & Caroline Kuzemko (ed.). Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy and Natural Resources. Chapter 23, 322-341. Edward Elgar Publishing. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783475636.00033.

The use of nuclear power has been driven by the motivation to meet growing electricity demand while avoiding dependence on imported fossil fuels and constrained by capacities to launch nuclear energy programmes. The chapter argues that tension between the two is a defining feature of the international political economy of nuclear energy. On the one hand, nuclear technology promises energy security and industrial modernisation. On the other hand, launching nuclear programmes can plunge countries into three forms of international dependence: on imported uranium, on production and disposal of nuclear fuel, and on the uneven capacities to manufacture nuclear reactors and construct nuclear power plants. The authors argue that international cooperation and competition profoundly shape how states deploy, expand and phase out their nuclear power programmes and brings together diverse international aspects of nuclear power which may increasingly shape the future of nuclear energy.

Comparing electricity transitions: a historical analysis of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan

Cherp, A., Vinichenko, V., Jewell, J., Suzuki, M. & Antal, M. (2017). Comparing electricity transitions: a historical analysis of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan. Energy Policy, 101, 612-628. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.10.044.

This paper contributes to understanding national variations in using low-carbon electricity sources by comparing the evolution of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan. It develops and applies a framework for analyzing low-carbon electricity transitions based on interplay of techno-economic, political and socio-technical processes. We explain why in the 1970s–1980s, the energy paths of the two countries were remarkably similar, but since the 1990s Germany has become a leader in renewables while phasing out nuclear energy, whereas Japan has deployed less renewables while becoming a leader in nuclear power. We link these differences to the faster growth of electricity demand and energy insecurity in Japan, the easier diffusion of onshore wind power technology and the weakening of the nuclear power regime induced by stagnation and competition from coal and renewables in Germany. We show how these changes involve the interplay of five distinct mechanisms which may also play a role in other energy transitions.

Quantifying uncertainties influencing the long-term impacts of oil prices on energy markets and carbon emissions

D.L. McCollum, J. Jewell, V. Krey, M. Bazilian, M. Fay & K. Riahi. (2016). Quantifying uncertainties influencing the long-term impacts of oil prices on energy markets and carbon emissions. Nature Energy, 1 (7), 16077. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.77. Preprint.

Oil prices have fluctuated remarkably in recent years. Previous studies have analysed the impacts of future oil prices on the energy system and greenhouse gas emissions, but none have quantitatively assessed how the broader, energy-systemwide impacts of diverging oil price futures depend on a suite of critical uncertainties. Here we use the MESSAGE integrated assessment model to study several factors potentially influencing this interaction, thereby shedding light on which future unknowns hold the most importance. We find that sustained low or high oil prices could have a major impact on the global energy system over the next several decades; and depending on how the fuel substitution dynamics play out, the carbon dioxide consequences could be significant (for example, between 5 and 20% of the budget for staying below the internationally agreed 2 C target). Whether or not oil and gas prices decouple going forward is found to be the biggest uncertainty.

Comparison and interactions between the long-term pursuit of energy independence and climate policies

J. Jewell, V. Vinichenko, D. McCollum, N. Bauer, K. Riahi, T. Aboumahboub, O. Fricko, M. Harmsen, T. Kober, V. Krey, G. Marangoni, M. Tavoni, D.P. Van Vuuren, B. Van Der Zwaan & A. Cherp. (2016). Comparison and interactions between the long-term pursuit of energy independence and climate policies. Nature Energy 1, 1-9. Gated. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.73.

Ensuring energy security and mitigating climate change are key energy policy priorities. The recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III report emphasized that climate policies can deliver energy security as a co-benefit, in large part through reducing energy imports. Using five state-of-the-art global energy-economy models and eight long- term scenarios, we show that although deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions would reduce energy imports, the reverse is not true: ambitious policies constraining energy imports would have an insignificant impact on climate change. Restricting imports of all fuels would lower twenty-first-century emissions by only 2–15% against the Baseline scenario as compared with a 70%reduction in a 450 stabilization scenario. Restricting only oil imports would have virtually no impact on emissions. The modelled energy independence targets could be achieved at policy costs comparable to those of existing climate pledges but a fraction of the cost of limiting global warming to 2 ◦ C.

Global energy security under different climate policies, GDP growth rates and fossil resource availabilities

A. Cherp, J. Jewell, V. Vinichenko, N. Bauer & E. D. Cian. (2016). Global energy security under different climate policies, GDP growth rates and fossil resource availabilities. Climatic Change, 136 (1), 83-94. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0950-x.

Energy security is one of the main drivers of energy policies. Understanding energy security implications of long-term scenarios is crucial for informed policy making, especially with respect to transformations of energy systems required to stabilize climate change. This paper evaluates energy security under several global energy scenarios, modeled in the REMIND and WITCH integrated assessment models. The paper examines the effects of long-term climate policies on energy security under different assumptions about GDP growth and fossil fuel availability. It uses a systematic energy security assessment framework and a set of global and regional indicators for risks associated with energy trade and resilience associated with diversity of energy options. The analysis shows that climate policies significantly reduce the risks and increase the resilience of energy systems in the first half of the century. Climate policies also make energy supply, energy mix, and energy trade less dependent upon assumptions of fossil resource availability and GDP growth, and thus more predictable than in the baseline scenarios.